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Foreword 
The focus of IIASA's Population Program is  population aging, particularly in 
the IIASA member nations. Changes in mortality, but t o  a much g rea t e r  extent 
changes in ferti l i ty,  account fo r  the  present  aging of the IIASA countries. This 
paper  discusses the anatomy of the most pronounced fertility change in recent  
times, the post-war baby boom. The presentation makes much use of newly- 
available graphical techniques, which allow the  r e a d e r  t o  visualize the demo- 
graphic t rends  in g r e a t  detail. The graphical tools also facili tate comparative 
analyses, such as t ha t  presented by the authors. 
Douglas Wolf 
Deputy Leader 
Populatfon Program 
Comparative Anatamy of Fertility Trends: 
The Aging of the Baby Boom 
Wovgang  L u t z  and Anatot i  Yashin 
1. introduction 
Modern ferti l i ty t rends  in industrialized countries s e e m  to follow strange and 
almost unpredictable patterns.  Y e t  t h e  comparative analysis of ferti l i ty t rends in 
different countries shows a surprising similarity in t h e  changing pat terns  of 
reproduction. Countries geographically as f a r  a p a r t  as t he  United States of Amer- 
i ca  and the  Federal Republic of Germany show almost parallel  ferti l i ty t rends  a f t e r  
1950 (with t h e  German rates consistently lower than the  American). 
W e  may assume tha t  in countries where the  decision to have children is deli- 
be ra t e  and more or less conscious, fluctuations in ferti l i ty re f lec t  fluctuations in 
the  desires  f o r  children. On t h e  aggregate level, such desires  may be influenced 
by economic conditions and, probably more important, by socio-cultural develop- 
ments and changes in attitudes. After World W a r  11, such conditions changed almost 
simultaneously. in North America and most European countries,  f i r s t  producing the  
baby boom and then the  baby bust. 
There are o the r  examples where countries as closely related as the  German 
Democratic Republic and t h e  Federal Republic of Germany exhibit  quite divergent 
trends. In this  case we can  assume tha t  the  diffusion of attitudinal and socio- 
economic changes relevant  f o r  childbearing was r a t h e r  weak between t h e  two Ger- 
man states. In addition to this, t he  GDR had an  explicitly pronatalistic policy 
which seemed to have had some effect  whereas t he  FRG abstained from population 
policy. With a total ferti l i ty rate of 1.26, the  FRG today has  the  lowest ferti l i ty 
level in t h e  world, whereas t h e  GDR holds around 1.7. 
In o r d e r  to understand the  baby boom and t h e  baby bust and the i r  conse- 
quences f o r  t h e  aging of t he  population, one must f i r s t  take a closer look at fertili- 
ty  rates over  time and age. What we need i s  a comparative analysis of many coun- 
tries examining age-specific period fluctuations as compared to changes in cohort  
fertility. In t h e  light of these  empirical findings we can then consider t h e  plausi- 
bility of severa l  models of explanation. In this  paper  w e  had to be selective in 
r e spec t  t o  t he  number of countries considered and especially in respec t  to expla- 
natory models. This study i s  mainly an attempt t o  survey the  extremely r ich empir- 
ical  material in a visual manner t ha t  makes you see t he  most important fea tures  at 
f i r s t  sight. The graphs  in this  paper  summarize more than 15,000 age- and period- 
specific ferti l i ty rates. 
2. Looking at Demographic Surfaces 
The traditional way of presenting data  in demography i s  based on using tables 
and two-dimensional (x-y) graphs.  Both approaches are appropr ia te  f o r  many 
problems in data  analysis. However, they sometimes a r e  not informative enough, 
especially when one needs to represen t  functional dependences among th ree  or 
more variables.  Rapid proliferation of computers and graphics  software have 
made i t  possible to easily plot three-dimensional graphs.  Such an  opportunity 
seems especially useful f o r  presenting many demographic character is t ics  which 
a r e  the functions of age and time. Providing a nice image of demographic linkages 
and giving information on major t rends in any direction on the  surface of the  
three-dimensional plot alone is  sometimes sti l l  not very convenient when we want to 
analyze the details and make a quantitative analysis of major dependences and ten- 
dencies. A supplementary approach is  based on using the shaded contour maps of 
demographic surfaces .  Shaded contour maps allow one to cap tu re  the  m o s t  impor- 
t an t  qualitative changes of the surface.  By using different shades, the methods 
provide the  quantitative values of demographic character is t ics  f o r  any point on 
the map. 1 
Unlike traditional methods of graphical analysis, interpreting contour maps 
requi res  some prac t ice  even f o r  the  most skilled scientists. After some training, 
however, reading the contour map should not be a problem. The method allows one 
t o  visualize the da ta  and of fe rs  a panoramic view which is impossible to obtain from 
the usual g raphs  of levels or rates at selected ages ove r  time or at selected times 
ove r  age. I t  allows illustration of da t a  in both age  and time directions, simultane- 
ously displaying the  en t i re  history of demographic character is t ics  (mortality, fe r -  
tility, morbidity, etc.)  in approximately one minute on an  inexpensive personal 
computer. 
%he respective computer program for an l B M  PC or compatible was developed a t  IIPSA (see Cam- 
bill, Vaupel, and Yashfn 1986). 
The contour  map provides  a clear and r i c h  represen ta t ion  of t h e  e n t i r e  demo- 
g raph ic  su r face .  While major peaks  and valleys are readily a p p a r e n t  from viewing 
three-dimensional plots, t r e n d s  are often obscured.  Contour maps are par t icular-  
ly effective at highlighting p a t t e r n s  in t h e  in teract ion of a g e ,  period,  and cohor t  
effects.  They c a n  b e  used as a n  initial s t e p  f o r  d a t a  analysis by helping to se lec t  
t h e  f r a i l  cohor t s ,  r evea l  t h e  consequences of t h e  most important social  economic 
events,  o r  t h e  most sensit ive a g e  groups .  After such a selection t h e  tradit ional  
g raph ic  analysis of demographic dependences might be  re levant .  
In o u r  p a p e r  we p r e s e n t  five fer t i l i ty  maps f o r  e a c h  of t h e  e ight  IIASA coun- 
t r i e s a 2  A t  t h e  top  r igh t ,  a three-dimensional plot  of age-specific fer t i l i ty  o v e r  
time, t o  t h e  l e f t  a contour  map; beside i t  a two-dimensional p lot  of t r e n d s  in t h e  to- 
t a l  fer t i l i ty  r a t e s ;  and,  finally at t h e  bottom, age  and time c u t s  f o r  t h e  highest  rate 
observed s ince  1947 and o t h e r  se lected a g e s  and years .  3 
3. Pre-World War II Fertility Trends 
Ferti l i ty t r e n d s  a f t e r  World W a r  I1 can  only be understood if we s e e  them 
within the  fe r t i l i ty  h is tory  of t h e  l a s t  century.  The findings from his tor ical  fert i l-  
i ty studies in Europe  ( for  su rveys  of t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  see e.g. Knodel and van d e  
Walle (1979) o r  Coale and  Watkins (1986)) indicate t h a t  until the  l a te  nineteenth 
cen tury ,  a l l  European countr ies  e x c e p t  France had a r a t h e r  constant  high level  of 
fer t i l i ty  which was only d i s to r ted  by s t rong  short-term fluctuation due t o  wars,  
famines, o r  o t h e r  exogenous events.  For  cen tur ies  most segments of the  population 
exhibi t  what Henry (1961) called na tu ra l  fer t i l i ty ,  i .e. a fer t i l i ty  regime where, 
within mar r iage ,  t h e  b i r t h  of a n  additional child did not  depend on t h e  number of 
chi ldren a l ready  b o r n  bu t  only on t h e  mother 's  age  and physical capacity.  A few 
decades  be fore  o r  a f t e r  1900 a l l  European countr ies  e n t e r e d  t h e  s e c u l a r  fer t i l i ty  
decline: a seemingly i r r e v e r s i b l e  transit ion from high uncontrolled fer t i l i ty  t o  
lower controlled fert i l i ty.  This transit ion was accompanied by changes in socio- 
economic environments and  mentality. A t  th is  point w e  d o  not intend a c lose r  exami- 
nation of t h e  determinants of th i s  s e c u l a r  change. 
%IASA member countrles  are: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakla, Flnland, France, the Cer- 
man Democretlc Republlc, the Federal Republlc of  Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, the  Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden, the  Union of S o v i e t  Soc la l l s t  Republics, and the United S t a t e s  of Amerlca. 
' ~ a t a  on a g e s p e c i f i c  f e r t l l l t y  r a t e s  originate from IIASA's denlog!-aphic data bank. 
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Table 1. Dates of a 10% decline in marital fertility from the  pre-industrial level in 
selected I I A S A  countries (1900 boundaries). 
Franoe lam Hungary 1910 
Germany 1888 Finland 1912 
Netherlands 1897 Bulgaria 1912 
Sweden 1902 Italy 1913 
Austria 1908 European Russia 1922 
Source: Coale and Treadway (1966). 
Table 1 shows the years  in which European IIASA countries f i r s t  experienced 
a 10% decline in marital fertility. As previously mentioned, France w a s  the f i r s t  
country t o  reduce marital ferti l i ty,  followed about 60 years  l a t e r  by Germany in 
1888. Over the next 30 years  most European countries followed those outriders.  In 
1922 European Russia also experienced a 109. decline. Finland had seen a decline 
in total  ferti l i ty already at the end of the eighteenth century but Lutz and Pitkanen 
(1986) shows tha t  this w a s  not due t o  marital fertility but t o  changes in the 
marriage pattern. More will be said on the  decomposition into nuptiality and mari- 
ta l  ferti l i ty t rends  l a t e r  on. 
For Finland, Canada, t h e  US, and Italy we have time ser ies  of age-specific fer- 
tility rates tha t  start before World W a r  11. A l l  four  countries exhibit declining fer-  
tility until the 1930s. The total  ferti l i ty rate declined from 3.35 in 1915 in the  US 
t o  less than 2.20 in 1936; in Finland i t  even declined from more than 4.50 in 1910 to 
less than 2.30 in 1933. Canadian ferti l i ty also displays a minimum in 1937. For Italy 
the  pa t te rn  is somewhat different with a local minimum of 2.95 in 1936 but a much 
C 
lower level of 2.45 in 1944-45. In all cases this decline i s  clearly p a r t  of the  g rea t  
secular  ferti l i ty transition. 
In many countries, the  late 1930s and ear ly  1940s s a w  a recovery of ferti l i ty 
rates but t he  last years  of the  w a r  in 1944-45 again caused a depression of fertili- 
ty  in all countries participating in the  w a r .  Finland w a s  exceptional in the  way tha t  
the  post-war baby boom s t a r t ed  already in 1945 and peaked in 1947. After tha t  fer- 
tility entered a new decline. A similar phenomenon of a n  ear ly  boom is visible in 
Canada and the  US where total fertility also reached a local maximum in 1947 but 
peaked again, together  with most o the r  western countries, in t he  la te  1950s and 
ear ly  1960s. In North America this real baby boom with total ferti l i ty rates above 
Graph 2 .  F e r t i l i t y  t r e n d s  f o r  
Canada.  
1 9 2 6  1 9 3 0  1 9 9 0  1 9 5 0  1 9 6 0  1 9 7 0  1 9 8 0  
years 
45-1983 
Canada - Fertility 1921 - 1  983 
3.7 w a s  much higher and more pronounced than in any European country. 
In the following section we will have a closer  look at this  unique phenomenon 
of the post-World War I1 baby boom. 
4. Comparat ive  Anatomy of the B a b y  Boom 
What i s  usually called the  post-war baby boom is a phenomenon tha t  appeared 
in quite different forms in various countries. What makes the  baby boom a distinct 
phenomenon is t ha t  i t  w a s  a n  unexpected significant increase in ferti l i ty that ,  ir-  
respective of different cultures,  religions, and socio-economic standing, took 
place in m o s t  industrialized countries at about t he  s a m e  time. 
This increase w a s  completely unexpected even to t h e  scholars  of demography 
who expected continuation of pre-World W a r  I1 ferti l i ty levels or even a fu r the r  
decline. I t  w a s  significant in a way tha t  i t  brought the  total  fer t i l i ty  rate up t o  an 
a l m o s t  pre-modern level. In t he  US, f o r  example, the  total  ferti l i ty r a t e  increased 
by more than 70% from 1935 to 1957; t he  ferti l i ty r a t e  of women in t he i r  ear ly  
twenties even more than doubled over  tha t  period. This unexpected increase of 
ferti l i ty did not seem t o  be  specific f o r  any cul ture  or economic system. I t  could be 
observed in Protestant  Scandinavia as well as in Catholic Italy, in  ea s t e rn  Europe 
as well as in t he  United States and Canada. And in all countries t he  increase oc- 
cu r red  within the  25 yea r s  following World W a r  11, even in countries tha t  did not 
participate in t he  w a r  such as Sweden and Switzerland. 
Table 2. Highest age-specific ferti l i ty r a t e s  observed a f t e r  1947. 
Peak of post- 
w a r  ferti l i ty Age Year Level 
Finland 25 1948 0.18 
US 22 1957 0.26 
Austria 24 1961 0.19 
Canada 23 1961 0.25 
France 24 1963 0.22 
FRG 25 1963 0.18 
Italy 26 1964 0.19 
GDR 20 1967 0.20 
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Graph 5. Fertility trends for 
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In all countries fertility t rends show a local maximum r ight  a f t e r  the  end of 
the  war in t he  Late 1940s. For some countries this w a s  already the  highest level of 
ferti l i ty experienced a f h r  World W a r  11, fo r  o the r  countries this  was only a sho r t  
recovery followed by the  real baby boom in the  ear ly  19609. Among t h e  eight IIASA 
countries studied in this paper ,  only Finland belongs to the  f i r s t  group with the  
peak of t h e  baby boom in 1948. From the  plots of age  distributions (see Appendix), 
we can see t ha t  in Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Japan, and Sweden, 
similar peaks in t he  number of bir ths  appea r  around 194843.  In all IIASA coun- 
t r i e s  except Finland this was followed by another  local maximum in the  ear ly 1980s. 
In Finland ferti l i ty declined a lmos t  monotonically between 1948 and 1974. After 
1975 a slight recovery i s  visible, especially f o r  women above age 25. 
Among the countries studied, France and Italy do not show a distinct peak of 
the  baby boom. In France total  fertility w a s  above the  level of 2.6 from 1945 until 
1966. Nevertheless, two peaks can be identified: one in 1947 and another in 1963. 
An analysis of t he  age pat terns  of fertility reveals  tha t  the  1947 peak included a 
higher percentage of bir ths  by women above age 30, whereas in t h e  peak of 1963 
women in the i r  ear ly  twenties played a major role. Hence, the age  pat tern of this 
second baby boom i s  similar to tha t  of the U S  and o the r  w e s t e r n  European coun- 
tries. In Italy t he  pat tern i s  somewhat similar to France. Only the  level of fertility 
between the  peaks of 1946 and 1964 w a s  significantly lower than in France. Again, 
women in their  twenties played a more significant role  in the second peak. Since 
1965 both countries have experienced steep ferti l i ty declines, especially f o r  
womenaboveage30. 
Fertility t rends in the  German Democratic Republic have a unique feature.  
Total fertility shows one peak in 1951, another peak in 1967, and a local maximum 
in 1980. Between the two f i r s t  peaks tha t  reached a level of about 2.5 children p e r  
woman, ferti l i ty had declined to a total fertility rate of less than 2.2. As in most 
o the r  countries the peak in 1965 w a s  mainly due to younger women, and hence can 
be called the  "real" baby boom. Between 1970 and 1974 ferti l i ty declined dramati- 
cally at all ages. In 1974 the  total  ferti l i ty rate w a s  about 30% lower than just four 
years  ear l ier .  This precipitous decline can be  seen in connection with the  intro- 
duction of new legislation in social politics that,  among others,  abolished restr ic-  
tions on abortion. In the  following yea r s  new social legislation was introduced to 
make childbearing more at t ract ive and the  total fertility r a t e  increased again to 
over  1.8 in 1980. Since then, a slow decline can be observed. 
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Fertility t rends in the  Federal Republic of Germany w e r e  quite different. 
First ,  t he re  was no peak in the ear ly  1950s as compared to  the  GDR. Instead, there  
was a steady increase of ferti l i ty r a t e s ,  especially of women in the i r  twenties. A 
peak w a s  reached in 1963 with a total  ferti l i ty rate of more than 2.5 children p e r  
woman. In the eleven yea r s  between 1966 and 1977, fertility- fell extremely rapidly 
at all ages; the total  ferti l i ty rate w a s  almost cu t  in half. This w a s  simultaneous to  
the s teep  decline in the GDR, but i t  was not followed by a recovery.  By now ferti l i ty 
in the FRG is  the lowest in the world at a level of less than 1.3 children p e r  woman. 
Fertility t rends in Austria w e r e  very similar t o  those in the  FRG, only the  lev- 
el of ferti l i ty has always been slightly higher and the  mean age of childbearing 
slightly lower. A s  in t he  FRG, the  baby boom in Austria w a s  clear ly  concentrated 
within a few calendar  yea r s  and a few yea r s  of age. Since 1970 the  modal age  of 
childbearing has  been shifting upwards. 
By f a r ,  the  highest concentration of t he  baby boom could be  observed in the  
US and Canada. In t he  US between 1956 and 1961, on the  average,  every  fourth 
woman aged 20 to 24 had one child in a year .  In Canada ferti l i ty levels w e r e  slightly 
lower but s t i l l  higher than in t he  baby boom of any o the r  industrialized country.  A t  
its peak the  total ferti l i ty rate was above 3.7 children p e r  women in those coun- 
t r ies ,  which w a s  clearly higher  than the  ferti l i ty levels shortly before  World War I. 
The contour maps also indicate tha t  the high ferti l i ty levels of t he  baby boom 
years  w e r e  to a l a rge  ex ten t  due t o  period fluctuations. N o  cohor t  of women born 
in this century in the  US had actually 3.7 children on the  average.  On the  contour 
map w e  can  follow the  diagonals t o  analyze the reproductive experience of cohorts  
of women. By looking at t he  maps in this respec t ,  we can  find tha t  f o r  every  coun- 
t r y  considered the  cohor t  of women tha t  participated in t h e  baby boom in the i r  
ea r ly  twenties exhibit  lower ferti l i ty in the i r  thirt ies than ea r l i e r  cohorts.  From 
this we can  visually understand the  f ac t  s t ressed by numerous authors  (see e.g. 
Ryder 1955) tha t  with r e spec t  t o  cohor t  ferti l i ty,  t he  baby boom was much less 
pronounced than with r e spec t  to period fertility. 
5- The Role of Marriage in the Baby Boom 
So f a r  t he  ferti l i ty rates given r e f e r r ed  to al l  women, regardless  if they were 
married or not. But i t  i s  a universally observed phenomenon tha t  ferti l i ty within 
marriage is higher than outside marriage. For this reason t rends in marriage 
strongly influence t rends in overall  fertility. In the following we t r y  t o  decompose 
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overall ferti l i ty into the marital ferti l i ty and nuptiality components. W e  do this by 
using the  indices developed by Ansley Coale in the course of the Princeton Europe- 
an Fertility Project .  
Coale (1969) developed a set of interrelated demographic indices to describe 
t rends in overall  ferti l i ty and i ts  nuptiality and marital ferti l i ty components. The 
indices r e l a t e  t he  actual population considered to the  population with the highest 
schedule of age-specific ferti l i ty on a reliable record :  the ferti l i ty of married 
Hutterite women in 1921-1930. Hence, the  index of overall  ferti l i ty (If) i s  defined 
by 
where B is  the  annual number of bir ths  to al l  women in a given period, wi is the  
number of women in each 5-year age interval from 15-49, and Fi is  the  ferti l i ty of 
married Hutterite women in each age interval (see Knodel 1974). The index of mar- 
i ta l  ferti l i ty (Ig) is  defined by 
where mi is  the number of married women in each  age  group and B' is the  annual 
number of legitimate births.  Finally, the  marriage index (I, ) summarizes the pro- 
portion married among women which i s  weighted at each  age  by the  Hutterite fe r -  
tility schedule. 
In the absence of illegitimacy, the following equation holds: 
And even in r e a l  populations with cer ta in  proportions of children born out of 
wedlock, t he  product of I, and Ig gives a r a t h e r  good approximation of If (Coale 
and Treadway 1986). 
In the  context of the European Fertility Project  these indices (plus an  addi- 
tional index I,, f o r  illegitimate ferti l i ty) w e r e  calculated f o r  the  period 1870-1960 
f o r  all  provinces of Europe. The following t w o  graphs  show how, ove r  the  period 
1910 to 1960, changes in overall  ferti l i ty If w e r e  induced by changes in marital 
ferti l i ty and n ~ p t i a l i t ~ . ~  The horizontal ax is  gives the value of the  marital ferti l i ty 
4 ~ a t a  for all IIASA countries are given In Appendix 1. Data and the setup of the graphs were ex- 
tracted from Coale and Treadway (1986). 
Graph 10. Changes in the relationship between I , Im, and If in 
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index Ig and the  vertical axis  tha t  of proportions married I,. Together, both pro- 
duce a level of overall  ferti l i ty If. 
In all t h r e e  countries in Graph 9,  namely Hungary, Finland, and Austria, t he  
s t eep  decline in overall  ferti l i ty between 1910 and 1930 w a s  mainly due to declining 
marital ferti l i ty;  proportions married declined only slightly. In Germany (GDR and 
FRG combined) and the  Netherlands (Graph y), t he  proportions married even in- 
c reased  ove r  tha t  period, though not strongly enough to offset t he  s teep  decline in 
marital fertility. 
Between 1930 and 1960 the  situation w a s  almost reversed. In Austria and Ger- 
many both I, and Ig increased, producing a s h a r p  increase in overall ferti l i ty,  i.e. 
the  peak of the  baby boom around 1980. In Germany proportions married in- 
creased significantly m o r e  than marital ferti l i ty,  indicating tha t  changing mar- 
riage pat terns  played a m o r e  important role in the  peak of the  baby boom than 
changes in the  number of children p e r  family. In Finland, the  Netherlands, and 
Czechoslovakia, overall ferti l i ty increased between 1930 and 1960, despite the  fac t  
tha t  marital ferti l i ty declined. Hence, the  observed increase in overall  fertility 
was exclusively due to increasing proportions of marrying women. In Hungary, Po- 
land, and Italy, the  observed ferti l i ty decline would have been much s t ronger  if the  
proportions married had not increased ove r  t he  s a m e  period. 
From the  eleven IIASA countries considered in t he  European Fertility Project ,  
only Austria and France clear ly  showed increasing levels of marital ferti l i ty 
between 1930 and 1960. In Germany a marginal increase could be  observed. Over 
t he  same period the  proportions married increased in all countries except  Europe- 
an Russia. 
h?arriage had been legally or socially and economically res t r ic ted  in many 
European countries. I t  was not until the  end of World W a r  I1 t ha t  these restrictions 
w e r e  completely abolished. During the economic boom of the 1950s, almost every- 
one who wanted to marry could afford to. And contrary to today's situation, the 
wish to marry s e e m s  to have been universal a t  tha t  time. Hence, w e  can conclude 
that  the baby boom was, t o  a large extent,  induced by a marriage boom. 
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Graph 11. P r o j e c t e d  age s t r u c t u r a l  changes ,  1950-2025. 
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Graph 12.  P r o j e c t e d  age  s t r u c t u r a l  changes ,  1950-2025. 
IlASA Countries, 1950-2025 
6. The Aging of the Baby &om 
Men and women born at the  peak of the  post-war baby boom will soon find 
themselves in the  si tuation t h a t  not only a t  t h e  time of t h e i r  b i r th  did they belong 
t o  t h e  l a rges t  age  g roup  of t h e  population, but tha t  at t h e  age  of re t i r ement  no 
o t h e r  age  g roup  will b e  more extensive than  t h e i r  own. This has  far-reaching 
consequences f o r  t h e i r  individual opportunit ies,  where they face  higher  competi- 
tion from day c a r e  c e n t e r s  to the  l abor  market  up t o  old-age homes, but  i t  a l so  has  
dramatic consequences f o r  t h e  society as a whole. 
Population aging i s  t h e  most important demographic problem f o r  industrial- 
ized countries.  Aging may b e  defined as a n  increase  In t h e  propor t ion of o lde r  peo- 
ple in t h e  to ta l  population which is  accompanied by a n  increase  in t h e  mean a g e  of 
the  population. In t e rms  of t h e  age  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  population, I t  charac te r izes  
t h e  s h i f t  from a population pyramid where t h e  a g e  groups  decline with age  to  a 
rectangle  where the  age  g roups  are of comparable size until a c e r t a i n  age  (60 or 
so)  o r ,  in some cases ,  even t o  a situation where o lder  age  g roups  are l a r g e r  than 
younger age  groups.  
The p rocess  of aging i s  a l ready  at a n  advanced s tage  in a number of European 
countr ies  but everything points toward much h igher  propor t ions  of t h e  aged in t h e  
future .  The major reason  f o r  th is  i s  t h e  continued very  low level of fer t i l i ty  in most 
industrialized countries.  Fur thermore,  fert i l i ty,  mortality, and migration deter-  
mine t h e  s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  size of t h e  population. Inmigration of guest  workers  In 
r e c e n t  decades tended to dampen t h e  p rocess  of aging in s e v e r a l  industrialized 
countr ies  because migrants were  usually below t h e  mean age  of t h e  population and 
t h e i r  fer t i l i ty  i s  usually much h igher  than  t h a t  of the  citizens of t h e i r  host  coun- 
t r y .  But in most European countr ies  t h e  e f fec t  of inmigration was not s t rong 
enough t o  s top  o r  even r e v e r s e  t h e  p rocess  of aging. 
Improvements in mortality, on t h e  o t h e r  hand, played a significant ro le  in 
making t h e  a g e  distribution rec tangu la r  by allowing higher  and higher  proportions 
of a bir th  c o h o r t  to survive  t o  old age.  Recent improvements in o l d a g e  mortality 
also led to a significant inc rease  in the  propor t ion of t h e  population above age  70. 
Since very  old people have a much h igher  r i sk  of being subject  t o  chronic  
diseases,  aging i s  not only a problem of t h e  proportion of the  population engaged 
in economic activity but i t  a l s o  carries dramatic implications f o r  t h e  health care 
system. The care f o r  chronically ill persons  above age  70 will soon become a major . 
problem f o r  aging societies.  
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Graph 13. Projected age structural changes, 1950-2025. 
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Graph 14. Projected age structural changes, 1950-2025. 
United States, 1950-2025 
By comparing t h e  e f fec t  of mortality and fert i l i ty on t h e  p rocess  of aging o v e r  
t h e  l a s t  decades  and in t h e  n e a r  future ,  i t  becomes c l e a r  t h a t  fer t i l i ty  changes 
played t h e  major ro le  in bringing about today's  d is tor ted age  distributions. When 
looking at t h e  population distributions of t h e  United S ta tes  (Graph 13)  and t h e  
Federal  Republic of Germany (Graph 4), we can s e e  the  s t rong impact of changing 
fert i l i ty.  The baby boom generation of around 1960 will r e t i r e  in 2025 (under an  
assumed re t i rement  age of 65). In most IIASA countries,  t h e i r  age  g roup  will not be  
smaller than t h a t  of chi ldren born at t h e  beginning of the  next  cen tury  because of 
the  low fer t i l i ty  levels tha t  can  be  expected t o  continue. A t  l eas t  t h e r e  i s  no evi- 
dent  r eason  why fer t i l i ty  should increase  again-most information available points 
towards f u r t h e r  d e c r e a s e s  in fert i l i ty.5 Hence t h e  projections shown, which are 
based on UN estimations with relat ively high fer t i l i ty  assumptions, are s t i l l  v e r y  
conservative.  
In the  g r a p h s  i t  i s  only the  remarkable  increases  of people aged o v e r  05 is  
pa r t ly  t h e  resu l t  of improving mortality conditions, but a l so  in p a r t  caused by 
g r e a t e r  b i r th  cohor t s  enter ing those ages.  I t  i s  a lso  in p a r t  improved survivor- 
ship t h a t  makes t h e  r idge  of the  baby boom sti l l  s o  s t rong at higher  ages.  When 
trying to assess t h e  re la t ive  effects  of fer t i l i ty  and mortality on t h e  p rocess  of 
aging, w e  find t h a t  f o r  the  changes up t o  t h e  late 20th century i t  i s  predominantly 
improving mortality and l a t e r  on primarily fer t i l i ty  (Lutz 1987). The quantitative 
f igure,  however, depends g rea t ly  on t h e  aging indicator selected.  
For  t h e  FRG, t h e  p ic tu re  i s  much more pronounced than f o r  t h e  US. Most 
unevenness in t h e  pa t t e rn  can  be t r a c e d  back t o  ups  and downs in t h e  number of 
b i r ths .  On top  of th is  t h e  wars selectively reduced some cohor t s  of men. This 
resu l t s  in ve ry  distorted sex ra t ios  at c e r t a i n  ages.  Because of a n  extended period 
of subreplacement fer t i l i ty  a f t e r  t h e  end of t h e  baby boom, younger cohor t s  a r e  
much smaller  than o lder  ones. 
There i s  no doubt t h a t  fer t i l i ty  i s  t h e  most important determinant of differen- 
t ials  in t h e  age  s t r u c t u r e  and the  p rocess  of aging. Mortality t r ends  and levels in 
t h e  US and t h e  FRG were,  excep t  f o r  t h e  two world wars, r a t h e r  similar and  can b e  
expected t o  b e  even more similar in t h e  fu tu re ,  but as Graphs 13 and 1 4  revea l  t h e  
age  s t r u c t u r e s  a r e  ve ry  different.  A s  we showed e a r l i e r ,  the  reason  f o r  th is  l ies in 
d i f ferent  fer t i l i ty  histories.  
% e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  possIbIlIty o f  unexpected t r e n d s  a lways  remains. We ntentloned b e f o r e  t h a t  the  
baby boom came completely  unexpect.ed. We now ut~derstattd t o  a great  exterlt  why I t  came. But 
s t l l l  some unexpected changes in n ~ e n t e l i t I e s  might o c c u r . ,  
7. Discussion 
The baby boom and the  subsequent decline in fer t i l i ty  were t h e  main f a c t o r s  
t h a t  produced t h e  dis tor ted age  pa t t e rns  of today's population under  age  30  and 
t h a t  will lead t o  ve ry  dramatic developments in t h e  propor t ion of r e t i r e d  t o  act ive  
people in t h e  next  30-40 years .  But even before  t h a t  t h e  decreas ing propor t ion of 
young people toge ther  with a h igher  propor t ion of v e r y  old persons ,  due t o  mortal- 
ity reductions at old ages ,  will bring d ras t i c  changes f o r  society.  
What a r e  the  fac to rs  behind these  fert i l i ty t r ends  t h a t  f i r s t  produced exceed- 
ingly l a r g e  c o h o r t s  and then extraordinar i ly  small ones? A t  th is  point w e  will not 
review t h e  ve ry  extensive l i t e r a t u r e  on fer t i l i ty  determinants. UTe will only selec- 
tively mention some of t h e  most common pa t t e rns  of in terpreta t ion.  
The previous section demonstrated tha t  changes  in t h e  marr iage pa t t e rn  
played a n  important ro le  in t h e  post-war fer t i l i ty  increase .  The decreasing inclina- 
tion t o  m a r r y  and a n  ex t raord inary  f a s t  r i s e  in divorce  r a t e s  have also a t t r ibuted 
t o  t h e  downward t rend  in fer t i l i ty  rates since t h e  1960s. Hence, nuptiality did not 
only contr ibute  t o  the  baby boom, i t  a l so  plays i t s  r o l e  in t h e  c u r r e n t  bust. But by 
no means i s  marr iage behavior t h e  only f a c t o r  explaining fer t i l i ty  fluctuations, 
especially in a si tuation where t h e  percentage of children born out  of wedlock i s  
becoming more and more significant. 
Richard Easter l in  (1980) s t ressed  what is usually r e f e r r e d  t o  as the  re la t ive  
income hypothesis (or  simply Easterlin-Hypothesis). Referring t o  t h e  empirical 
evidence f o r  the  United S ta tes ,  h e  argued t h a t  a young family's expected income, 
re la t ive  to t h e  aspira t ions  t h e  spouses bring from t h e i r  parents '  families, plays a 
cruc ia l  r o l e  in the  couple 's  decision on family size. The small cohor t s  born during 
t h e  depress ion of the  1930s had r a t h e r  low material  aspira t ions  due t o  t h e  difficult 
living circumstances of t h e i r  time, but because t h e r e  w a s  l e s s  competition f o r  jobs 
and t h e  economy w a s  booming during the  l a te  1950s and e a r l y  1960s, t h e  available 
income by f a r  exceeded the  aspira t ions  f o r  those young families and they decided 
t o  have many chi ldren.  For  those  children born as p a r t  of t h e  baby boom, the  
situation i s  r e v e r s e d  and they will have only a few children.  The purely demo- 
g raph ic  side of this arguments says  t h a t  small cohor t s  tend t o  have high fer t i l i ty  
and l a rge  cohor t s  low fer t i l i ty  holding economic conditions constant. Our empirical 
analysis can  contr ibute  t o  t h e  evaluation of th is  argument in di f ferent  countries.  
The demographic side of t h e  Easter l in  argument can be  evaluated in r e s p e c t  
t o  two aspects :  does t h e  per iod between low and high fer t i l i ty  real ly  correspond t o  
the  mean length of a generation,  and i s  t h e  fluctuation real ly  a cohor t  
phenomenon? The second a s p e c t  was a l ready  discussed e a r l i e r  and we came to the  
conclusion tha t  in a l l  countr ies  young families t h a t  had many children at the  time 
of t h e  baby boom did not continue childbearing in t h e  l a te  1960s when they became 
30. Hence, the  main argument should not be  t h a t  members of small b i r th  cohor t s  
have h igher  completed fer t i l i ty  but t h a t  they start out  f a s t e r  and have t h e i r  chil- 
d r e n  at younger ages.  The remaining cyclical  fluctuation of c o h o r t  fer t i l i ty  i s  much 
less  impressive than  t h e  period perspective.  
But was t h e r e  real ly  any cyclical  pa t t e rn?  In t h e  U S  the  per iod between t h e  
lowest fer t i l i ty  in 1933 and t h e  highest  fert i l i ty in 1957 i s  indeed about  t h e  mean 
length of a generation.  But th is  relat ionship no longer holds when w e  move up and 
down t h e  time scale:  t h e  l a r g e  cohor t s  born  around 1920-25 should have t h e i r  
lower number of chi ldren around 1945-50 which w a s  in f a c t  a period of fas t  fer t i l -  
i ty increase .  Similarly, t h e  st i l l  v e r y  small cohor t s  born around 1940 had much 
lower fer t i l i ty  than t h e  cohor t s  born in the  e a r l y  1930s. For  o t h e r  countr ies  with 
time s e r i e s  on a g e s p e c i f i c  fer t i l i ty  s t a r t ing  e a r l i e r  in  th is  cen tury ,  the  argument 
i s  even much weaker than in t h e  U.S. In Finland, f o r  instance,  the  t i m e  between the  
low fer t i l i ty  of t h e  1930s and t h e  peak of t h e  baby boom w a s  only about  1 2  years .  
Between 1955 and 1965 when the  small cohor t s  were in t h e i r  prime childbearing 
ages,  fer t i l i ty  was declining steeply.  In Italy even t h e  unusually l a r g e  cohor t s  
born  in 1938-40 produced the  peak of t h e  baby boom in 1964. For  many o t h e r  
countr ies  t h e  time s e r i e s  a r e  too  s h o r t  t o  s a y  much about  cyclical pa t t e rns .  W e  
c a n  only s e e  t h a t  t h e  extremely low level of period fer t i l i ty  observed in most coun- 
t r i e s  around 1978 w a s  at a time when t h e  women in the  prime childbearing ages  
came from r a t h e r  small pre-baby boom cohorts .  Much more could b e  said about  
cyclical  pa t t e rns  and more sophist icated methods could be  applied,  but t h e  prima 
facie impression i s  t h a t  t h e  demographic evidence f o r  Easter l in  cycles i s  
extremely weak in most of t h e  countr ies  w e  considered.  
The s t e e p  decline of fer t i l i ty  a f t e r  t h e  peak of t h e  baby boom has  often been 
associated uiith the  introduction of new effective contracept ive  methods, espe- 
cially t h e  pill which a p p e a r e d  in t h e  1960s and quickly became very  popular.  The 
pill h a s  facil i tated a l iberalization of sexual a t t i tudes  by g rea t ly  diminishing t h e  
r i sk  of conception and i t  a l so  contributed t o  t h e  postponement of marriage.  
Despite t h e  medical concerns  o v e r  t h e  years ,  the  pill continues t o  be the  most com- 
monly used effect ive  method of contraception f o r  women, especially those under 
age  30. Surgical  steri l ization f o r  contracept ive  purposes  is  a l so  widely used in t h e  
US at older  ages.  Induced abor t ions  were legalized in the  US in 1973 and in many 
o t h e r  industrialized countr ies  around t h a t  time. In most countr ies  t h e  number of 
abor t ions  steadily inc reased  until i t  seemed to level  off in the  1980s. For  t h e  U S  it 
i s  estimated t h a t  in 1984,  259, of a l l  pregnancies were terminated by induced abor-  
tions (Westoff 1986). 
However, these  proximate determinants of fer t i l i ty  only- explain the  how but  
not  t h e  why- of fer t i l i ty  t rends .  In modern socie t ies  the  number of chi ldren born  is  
mainly determined by the  couple 's  a t t i tudes  and intentions. Of course  a c e r t a i n  
pe rcen tage  of couples ends  up with more or less  chi ldren than  they originally 
intended (e.g. Gisser  e t  a l .  1985). Despite th is  inconsistency between d e s i r e s  and 
real i ty ,  fer t i l i ty  intentions and t h e i r  changes o v e r  the  life cycle  remain the  cru-  
cial  f a c t o r  in explaining fer t i l i ty  pat terns .  These intentions or des i res  a r e  the  
resu l t  of a v e r y  complex p r o c e s s  t h a t  h a s  i t s  r o o t s  in childhood exper iences  and 
t h e  normative system of t h e  pa ren t s ,  own inclinations, education,  job opportuni-  
t ies ,  the  economic: situation, and the  relat ionship t o  one's  p a r t n e r .  For  t h e  link 
between des i res  and real i ty ,  not only contracept ion bu t  a l so  physical a spec t s  of 
fecundability play a c e r t a i n  ro le .  Summarizing t h e  findings from a number of 
r e c e n t  fer t i l i ty  s tudies  (Lutz 1985), i t  can  be  said tha t  t h e r e  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  no indi- 
cations of dramatic changes  in  t h e  determinants of des i red  family size in the  n e a r  
f u t u r e  t h a t  would bring abou t  significantly h igher  fer t i l i ty  levels.  On t h e  con- 
t r a r y ,  many f a c t o r s  point towards st i l l  lower fert i l i ty.  
The understanding of fer t i l i ty  intentions on a n  individual level  i s  extremely 
complex, bu t  t h e i r  consequences a r e  v e r y  re levan t  on a n  aggrega te  level. The 
f u t u r e  p rocess  of population aging will, to a l a r g e  extent ,  depend on t h e  family size 
des i res  of young couples. The population project ions  presented in th i s  p a p e r  are 
based on ve ry  optimistic fer t i l i ty  assumptions of the  IJN, t h a t  assume increasing 
levels f o r  some countr ies  in t h e  n e a r  fu ture .  Scenar ios  of f u r t h e r  decreas ing fe r -  
tility r e su l t  in a n  even f a s t e r  and  more pronounced p rocess  of aging than shown in 
the  g raphs .  
Even though fer t i l i ty  rates cannot be  projected,  we already- know the  number 
of women t h a t  will be in t h e i r  prime childbearing ages  in  the  next  25  y e a r s .  Large  
cohor t s  of women such as those b o r n  during the  baby boom will produce a l a r g e r  
number of chi ldren even if a v e r a g e  fer t i l i ty  remained constant  simply because  
potential mothers a r e  l a r g e r  in numbers. This phenomenon c a n  b e  c lea r ly  seen in 
most g r a p h s  giving t h e  projected population to the  y e a r  2025 (see Graphs  11 to 
14).  I t  i s  cal led the  e c h o  of the  baby boom. Especially in countr ies  with a very 
pronounced and concentra ted  baby boom, this  e c h o  i s  visible as a second wave of 
b i r ths  following t h e  baby boom by about  25 y e a r s  (see, f o r  instance,  t h e  g r a p h s  f o r  
Poland, Czechoslovakia, FRG, and o the r s ) .  These echos  have led to a n  inc rease  in 
t h e  absolute number of b i r t h s  in severa l  countr ies  at present .  Journal is ts  and pol- 
iticians have to b e  cautious so as not to i n t e r p r e t  th is  as a n  inc rease  in fer t i l i ty  
but  as t h e  a g e  s t r u c t u r a l  e f fec t  i t  rea l ly  is. 
The baby boom generat ion in most countr ies  i s  cu r ren t ly  in  t h e i r  mid-twenties. 
Their  members f aced  more difficult conditions when t ry ing t o  e n t e r  the  l a b o r  
market  than  many generat ions  be fo re  them. This is  p a r t  of t h e  reason  f o r  the  high 
youth uncmployment we cur ren t ly  obse rve  and of crowded universi t ies and o t h e r  
phenomena re la ted  to c o h o r t  size.  This h a r d e r  competition will g o  on o v e r  the i r  
whole life and even a f t e r  re t i rement ,  s ince  in many countr ies  t h e  c o h o r t  born  at 
t h e  peak of the  baby boom will b e  t h e  l a r g e s t  a g e  g roup  in  t h e  population until age 
70 o r  even  beyond. For  t h e  cohor t s  following them i t  will b e  e a s i e r  again but  st i l l  
they may s u f f e r  from t h e  f a c t  tha t  many positions will be filled with relat ively 
young people and,  in positions where t h e  e x a c t  age  is  not  s o  important ,  they will 
have t o  compete with the  baby boomers. 
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Appendix Table  1 
1910 1930 1960 
If Is Im If Is 1, If Is Im 
Austria .345 .588 .517 .I24 .I86 .452 .219 .330 .588 
Bulgaria .514 594 .737 -292 .379 .750 .I96 .236 .T76 
Czechoslovakia - - - .205 .327 . .558 .I92 .254 -722 
Finland .320 .G47 .459 .200 .455 .404 .215 .343 .602 
France .204 .315 .591 .I82 .273 .613 .222 .323 .646 
Germany .312 -542 -524 .I79 .284 .583 .202 .293 -644 
Hungary .388 ,529 .665 .235 .357 .598 .I58 .207 .725 
Italy .346 .616 .534 .255 .471 -513 200 .338 .578 
Netherlands -312 .652 .4G9 -227 .446 .499 .252 .394 .630 
Poland - - - .290 .501 544 244 .335 .696 
European Russia - - - .428 .G65 .628 .207 -356 581 
Appendix Graphs 
Age distributions 1950-2025 for 
all IIASA countries if graph 
is not given in the text 
Source: Population Program's data bank 
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